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Humans routinely incur costs when allocating resources and reject distributions judged to be 35 
below/over an expected threshold. The Dictator/Ultimatum Games (DG/UG) are two-player games 36 
that quantify prosociality and inequity aversion by measuring allocated distributions and rejection 37 
thresholds. Although the UG has been administered to chimpanzees and bonobos, no study has used 38 
both games to pinpoint their motivational substrate. We administered a DG/UG using pre-assigned 39 
distributions to four chimpanzee dyads controlling for factors that could explain why proposers’ 40 
behavior varied substantially across previous studies: game order, cost for proposers and amount for 41 
recipients. Moreover, players exchanged their roles (proposer/recipient) to test reciprocity. Our results 42 
show that proposers offered more in the DG than in the non-social baseline, particularly when they 43 
incurred no cost. In UG, recipients accepted all above-zero offers, suggesting absence of inequity 44 
aversion. Proposers preferentially chose options that gave larger amounts to the partner. However, 45 
they also decreased their offers across sessions, probably being inclined to punish their partner’s 46 
rejections. Therefore, chimpanzees were not strategically motivated towards offering more generously 47 
to achieve ulterior acceptance from their partner. We found no evidence of reciprocity. We conclude 48 
that chimpanzees are generous rational maximizers that may not engage in strategic behavior.  49 
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INTRODUCTION 60 
The last decade has produced abundant comparative research with non-human primates on the 61 
evolutionary origins of human prosociality and the sense of fairness. Even though great apes such as 62 
chimpanzees engage in cooperative hunting and food sharing in the wild, laboratory studies have 63 
consistently found that chimpanzees do not usually provide windfall resources to partners at no cost 64 
(Silk et al., 2005) and do not understand justice as humans do (eg. Riedl, Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 65 
2012). Generally, testing procedures involve two conspecifics facing a food distribution task that may 66 
potentially trigger phenomena such as inequity aversion (eg. Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; but see 67 
Engelmann, Clift, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2017), no cost prosociality (eg. Horner, Carter, Suchak, & 68 
de Waal, 2011), food sharing (Silk, Brosnan, Henrich, Lambeth, & Shapiro, 2013) or reciprocity (eg. 69 
Amici et al., 2014). Bargaining games, such as the dictator (DG) and the ultimatum (UG) games 70 
(Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) are particularly appealing because they combine each of 71 
these phenomena simultaneously.  72 
In both games, a proposer splits a windfall in any way she desires with her partner. Whereas 73 
the DG recipient is passive and has to accept the proposer’s offer, the UG recipient can either accept 74 
or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, each partner receives the corresponding split but if the offer 75 
is rejected nobody receives anything. Since the DG recipient cannot affect the final outcome of the 76 
distribution, any non-zero offer by the proposer indicates the latter’s prosocial tendency. In contrast, 77 
the proposer’s offer in the UG is composed of her prosocial tendency plus her strategic estimation of 78 
what the recipients are likely to accept. When confronted with resource distribution games, humans 79 
take into account their own and their partners’ prosocial tendencies and social aversions to avoid 80 
conflict. Although there are substantial cross-cultural differences (Camerer, 2003; Engel, 2011; Güth 81 
& Kocher, 2014; Henrich et al., 2005; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), human proposers make 82 
offers above zero in both games, usually higher in the UG than the DG, and human recipients often 83 
reject options smaller than 20% and sometimes even bigger than 50%. Taken together, these results 84 
contradict the rational maximizer’s perspective since some humans are willing to give and reject at 85 
their own cost (Güth & Kocher, 2014). Importantly, we use the term “rational maximizer” to indicate 86 
that when there is something to be gained, subjects take it regardless of what someone else got as a 87 
result, even if that someone was responsible for creating that choice in the first place. 88 
Current interest in the evolutionary roots of fairness and its psychological underpinnings have 89 
led researchers to confront pairs of individuals with various social dilemmas including several 90 
versions of the UG (Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2007; Kaiser et al., 2012; Proctor, Williamson, de 91 
Waal, & Brosnan, 2013). Following the mini-ultimatum procedure developed by Falk and colleagues 92 
(2003), Jensen et al. (2007) presented dyads of chimpanzees with preselected pairs of quantities (e.g., 93 
5/5 vs. 8/2, with the first of each pair representing the proposer’s allocation). The proposer could 94 
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select one of the pairs by pulling a rod that brought the offer halfway. Then, the recipient accepted by 95 
pulling another rod that delivered the offer to both subjects or rejected by not pulling during 60s, thus 96 
ending the trial without any food within reach. Kaiser and colleagues (2012) tested chimpanzees and 97 
bonobos in a procedure where they allowed the proposers to “steal” some of the food originally 98 
allocated to the recipient before making an offer, to see whether this enhanced rejections. In both 99 
studies, proposers did not incur cost to make equal offers whereas recipients showed no inequity 100 
aversion since they never rejected non-zero outcomes. Consequently, unlike humans, chimpanzees 101 
and bonobos behaved as rational maximizers. With regard to recipients, one argument against this 102 
conclusion was that 0-options were accepted approximately half of the time (Jensen et al., 2007). 103 
According to some authors, chimpanzees might not have behaved as rational maximizers (Brosnan, 104 
2013). According to others (Henrich & Silk, 2013), rejecting 0-option half of the time implies 105 
responding at chance, which is compatible with rational maximizing as both accepting and rejecting 106 
leads to zero outcome. Smith and Silberberg (2010) offered an alternative explanation. They found 107 
that apes’ data were reproducible in humans by increasing the delay to reject from 1 to 5 minutes. 108 
Namely, when humans were forced to wait 5 minutes (instead of 1) to reject an offer, they tended to 109 
accept anything to initiate the next trial and thus increased their likelihood of obtaining something. 110 
This means that 60s may have been too long to wait for chimpanzees (Jensen et al., 2007) who may 111 
have accepted 0-offers  to initiate a new trial with better prospects.  112 
Another relevant aspect for bargaining methodologies is the way proposers make offers and 113 
recipients respond to them. One solution is using token exchange procedures to substitute the direct 114 
presence of food for an object (the token equals some distribution of food) and to emulate a physical 115 
interchange. Proctor and colleagues (2013) compared chimpanzees’ responses in an UG and in a 116 
preference test using tokens, each of them allocating a different amount of food to the proposer and 117 
the recipient (5/1 vs. 3/3). Proposers selected one token, gave it to the recipient who could then either 118 
give it to a begging experimenter (accept) or keep it during the next 30s (reject). In their preference 119 
test, proposers gave tokens directly to the experimenter while a naïve passive recipient sat in the 120 
adjacent cage. Although the authors treated this preference test as a DG, this is unwarranted because 121 
the proposer did not give anything directly to the recipient, turning it into a non-social game (Henrich 122 
& Silk, 2013). The authors found that proposers selected the 3/3 token more often in the UG than in 123 
the preference test. However, the interpretation of this result is controversial. Henrich and Silk (2013) 124 
pointed out that the change towards 3/3 was not different from chance in two out of the three dyads. 125 
In response, Brosnan and de Waal (2014) claimed that this change of behavior between conditions 126 
reflected second-order inequity aversion as chimpanzees might have anticipated a conflict. However, 127 
since rejections never occurred and no experimental evidence for that potential anticipation was 128 
provided, this remains a mere conjecture. Pairing a prototypical DG with an UG would have been 129 
highly desirable because it would have allowed researchers to distinguish intrinsic (i.e., give) from 130 
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strategic (i.e., give to receive) prosociality. Furthermore, the absence of 0-options or the inclusion of a 131 
begging human experimenter may have substantially hindered the appearance of rejections.  132 
 In sum, the evolutionary picture of fairness based on the UG remains rather ambiguous. 133 
Whereas two studies characterize ape proposers as selfish (Jensen et al., 2007; Kaiser et al., 2012) 134 
another study characterizes them as prosocial (Proctor et al., 2013) but in any case, whether this is 135 
based on intrinsic or strategic motivation remains unclear. Moreover, although all studies have shown 136 
that recipients accept any offers above zero, there are different interpretations about the absence of 137 
rejections in recipients (Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2013; Proctor, Williamson, de Waal, & Brosnan, 138 
2013). The goal of this study is to shed light on these issues by comparing chimpanzees’ responses in 139 
an iterated DG/UG that manipulated the cost to the proposers and the size of the gift to recipients. 140 
Players faced each other across a table and the proposer selected one of two food windfalls by pulling 141 
a rope that distributed it among the two players. Moreover, in the UG the recipient could accept the 142 
proposer’s choice by pulling another rope or reject it by not pulling for 15s (see Figure 1b). We are 143 
aware that a go/no go paradigm for rejections in UG diminishes exact comparison with UG human 144 
procedures, but the reduction of rejection time to 15s decreases the likelihood of unmotivated refusals 145 
(Smith & Silberberg, 2010). Two key features of our study deserve special mention. First, our 146 
ABACA design alternated between non-social (A) and social games (B and C represented DG or 147 
UG), a feature that allowed us to obtain a reliable estimate of the baseline tendency to select each 148 
option in the absence of a partner as well as their understanding of the game and the stability of their 149 
response.  150 
Second, we manipulated the cost for proposers and the size of the gift for the recipient. The 151 
latter allowed us to know whether proposers considered their partner’s payoff in their offers and 152 
whether recipients rejected based on advantageous (rejection of high gift) or disadvantageous 153 
(rejection of low gift) inequity aversion. The inclusion of a 6/0 option measured the likelihood of 154 
rejecting when receiving nothing and served as an anchor point against which all other options were 155 
pitted (6/3, 5/3, 5/9, 6/9, see Table 1 for further information). Importantly, we are aware that using 156 
small quantities may produce different recipients’ responses than larger rewards. However, it is not 157 
only the design feasibility that justifies their use, but also the idea that only when differential rates 158 
between the rewards are small, moral emotions are activated, thus allowing us to explore whether they 159 
are present in non-human animals. Finally, chimpanzees played reciprocal trials (i.e. every dyad 160 
played the same condition switching roles) to see whether second-order inequity aversion or 161 
reciprocity occurred. We also scored any communicative acts (see SI).  162 
Figure 1 around here 163 
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 164 
Figure 1. Illustration of the apparatus for the DG (a) and UG (b) in the condition 6/0 (background) 6/3 165 
(foreground). The proposer is depicted on the left and the recipient on the right. In the DG, the 166 
recipient cannot reject the offer. In the UG, the recipient can respond to the offer by pulling the U-167 
shaped rope (accept) or not (reject) once the proposer has chosen one option. 168 
METHODS  169 
The Committee of Bioethics at the University of Barcelona (IRB00003099) and the ethics committee 170 
of the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Center (WKPRC) approved the study. 171 
Participants. Six chimpanzees (4 males; mean age= 15 years) housed at the WKPRC in Leipzig Zoo 172 
(Germany) participated in the study. We tested four dyads. Even though dyads consisted of forced 173 
partner combinations, we carefully chose kin or nonkin social tolerant partners because previous 174 
studies had shown those partners to be successful in cooperation (eg. Melis, 2006; Suchak, Eppley, 175 
Campbell, & de Waal, 2014). Two subjects (Lobo, Kofi) played twice to informally explore whether 176 
they changed their behavior depending on the partner they were playing with (see Table S1 for 177 
detailed information upon age, sex, rearing history and previous participation in Jensen et al.’s study 178 
(Jensen et al., 2007)).  179 
Materials. We used two similar apparatuses for the UG and DG (see Figure 1). The DG apparatus 180 
consisted of a PVC table with two parallel guide rails running from the proposer’s side to the 181 
recipient’s side. A pair of trays located on top of each rail holding various food distributions 182 
constituted one of the options that the proposer could select by pulling a rope so that the trays on the 183 
corresponding rail moved in opposite directions: the closest tray moved toward the proposer and the 184 
farthest tray toward the partner. The UG apparatus was similar except that when the proposer pulled, 185 
the trays in that rail moved in opposite directions but stopped halfway to the recipient making a piece 186 
of Velcro accessible to him so that he could decide whether to pull to complete the movement of the 187 
trays (accept) or not (after 15s reject, see Video for illustrative examples of acceptance and rejection 188 
and SI for further detailed information about the apparatus). 189 
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Table 1 around here 190 
 191 
Table 1. Conditions and maximizing choices. Quantities used in non-social (Door Open/Door Closed) 192 
and social games. Depicted are the outcomes in each non-social condition based on a maximizing 193 
outcome. We also provide the labels of each pair of options used in social games to illustrate the 194 
factors assessed (cost for the proposer; gift for the recipient) 195 
 196 
 197 
 198 
Food and conditions. We used small pieces of grapes/pellets, depending on dyads’ food preferences. 199 
We configured the conditions following Hanus and Call (2007) to have higher differences and lower 200 
ratios between final outcomes. Thus, we had four conditions with a default 6/0 option pitted against 201 
another option controlling for cost to be generous (in no cost conditions, the proposers could be 202 
generous with their partners for free by always earning 6 pieces of food whereas in cost conditions 203 
that would imply losing 1 piece of food by deciding between 6/0 and 5/x) and size of gift (in small 204 
gift conditions, the proposers could raise their partner’s outcome to 3 pieces of food, less than their 205 
own profit (i.e. 6/0 and 6/3), whereas in large gift conditions, the partner’s outcome would surpass 206 
their own (i.e., 6/0 and 6/9). We varied some pairs of quantities between non-social and social games 207 
(see Table 1) to test for the chimpanzees’ understanding of the task. The condition 0/0 and 0/3 208 
increased the salience of the recipient’s side allowing us to analyze whether subjects payed attention 209 
to the consequences of their choices with respect to the pay-offs on their side. The condition 6/0 and 210 
5/0 allowed us to ensure that subjects discriminated quantities (6 vs 5) and the cost was significant to 211 
them.  212 
Non-social 
Door Open 
Choice if 
maximization 
Non-social 
Door 
Closed 
Choice if 
maximization 
Social 
games 
UG/DG 
Labels 
in Social games 
Proposer Recipient 
6/0 and 6/3 6/3 6/0 and 6/3 chance 6/0 and 6/3 No Cost Small gift 
6/0 and 5/3 5/3 6/0 and 5/3 6/0 6/0 and 5/3 Cost Small gift 
6/0 and 5/9 5/9 6/0 and 6/9 chance 6/0 and 6/9 No Cost Large gift 
0/0 and 0/3 0/3 6/0 and 5/0 6/0 6/0 and 5/9 Cost Large gift 
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Procedure and design. We used an ABACA design (A: training non-social, B/C: social games). The 213 
training consisted of 6 conditions that were played across 8 sessions of 12 trials each. We conducted 214 
the training before the social games and post-training after each social game, therefore each subject 215 
played 24 non-social sessions. The state of the door was relevant during the training. The closed door 216 
did not allow the subject to gain access to the adjacent cage. Therefore, maximizing the pay-off only 217 
required paying attention to the options on the subject’s side (the food allocated to the other side could 218 
not be obtained). Thus, we could control whether subjects would preferentially choose maximizing 219 
quantities (eg. 6/0, obtaining 6, rather than 5/3, obtaining 5, see Door close conditions in Table 1). 220 
The open door allowed subjects access to the adjacent cage. Therefore, maximizing the pay-off 221 
required  the subject to pay attention to trays on its side as well as on the other side, understand how 222 
trays moved and avoid natural impulses to pick always the closest and highest quantities in order to 223 
choose the maximizing option (eg. 5/3, obtaining 8, rather than 6/0, obtaining 6, see open door 224 
conditions in Table 1). Table 1 shows how subjects should vary their choices depending on the state 225 
of the door to prove their understanding of the game. In each session, one given condition was played 226 
during three non-consecutive trials. Chimpanzees played alone and passed the training when they 227 
chose the maximizing option at least in 80% of the trials per condition. We counterbalanced the order 228 
of the conditions, the sides of each option and the room where the actor played.  229 
Each dyad played both UG and DG. Each game consisted of 8 sessions, 12 trials per session. The 230 
proposer and recipient roles alternated from trial to trial (e.g., in trial 1 the condition 6/0 and 6/3 is 231 
played; Alex plays as proposer and Jahaga as recipient; in trial 2, the condition is maintained but Alex 232 
is the recipient and Jahaga the proposer). Therefore, to analyze reciprocity we measured whether 233 
dyads matched their choices in each pair of reciprocal trials and whether this remained constant across 234 
sessions. The order of the games was counterbalanced across dyads (i.e., ABACA or ACABA). Every 235 
trial started with the experimenter placing the food out of sight from the participants. When the 236 
proposer chimpanzee chose one option, in DG, both players got access to the food immediately (see 237 
Figure 1a) whereas in UG, the experimenter waited for 15 seconds for the recipient to pull from the 238 
Velcro (see Figure 1b). If the recipient did not pull, the food was removed. Regardless of rejection or 239 
acceptance, the inter-trial interval remained constant.  240 
ANALYSIS 241 
We used Generalized Linear Mixed Models (GLMM; (Baayen, 2008)) with binomial error structure 242 
and logit link function to analyze subjects’ choices (see Table 2 for an overview of the fitted models). 243 
When subjects delivered food to the opposite side we scored 1, otherwise we scored 0. We also 244 
examined when recipients in the UG rejected offers and whether the offer in the previous trial (or the 245 
average offer in the previous session) affected the offer of the prior recipient in the current trial (short-246 
term reciprocity). We examined the effect of communicative attempts between proposers and 247 
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recipients. We coded two behaviors: “pointing”, if the subjects placed their index finger or their hand 248 
through the decision window for more than 3s and “interaction”, when the subjects touched or passed 249 
objects to each other through the mesh. We analyzed the two different responses separately. To 250 
examine whether they performed any of these responses at different rates in each social game we used 251 
the frequency of these responses as dependent variables. Moreover, as pointing and interaction could 252 
enhance the probability of the proposer to deliver more food (i.e. choosing 6/3 instead of 6/0) or to 253 
incur a cost (i.e. choosing 5/3 instead of 6/0), we analyzed whether these communication attempts 254 
were related to the proposer’s choice. For further information on the model specification, random 255 
effect structure, model stability and assumptions, see SI. 256 
Table 2 around here 257 
Table 2. Summary of the main GLMMs performed. See more information in SI. 258 
GLMM Data analyzed Dependent variables Predictor variables 
Game 
understanding 
(GLMM01) 
non-social door 
open and door 
closed, common 
conditions 
Food for recipient’s 
side 
cost, gift, state of door, session, 
trial number, training phase, 
cost x door 
Difference UG/DG 
(GLMM02) 
UG, DG, all 
conditions 
Food for recipient game, cost, gift, (all 2-way 
interactions), session, trial 
number 
Change of behavior 
between social and 
non-social games 
(GLMM03) 
non-social (door 
closed), 
UG, DG, 
common 
conditions 
Food for recipient’s 
side 
game, cost, game x cost 
Rejection 
(GLMM04) 
UG, all 
conditions 
Rejection of offer cost, gift, session, trial number, 
cost x gift 
Reciprocity 
(GLMM05 / 
GLMM06) 
UG, DG, all 
conditions 
Food for recipient’s 
side 
game, cost, gift, previous 
prosocial offer, trial number, 
session, and all 2-way 
interactions between previous 
prosocial offer and game, cost, 
and gift 
Pointing 
(GLMM07) 
UG, DG, all 
conditions 
Pointing  game, session, trial number 
Effect of pointing 
on prosocial choices 
(GLMM08) 
UG, DG, all 
conditions 
Food for recipient recipient pointing, game, cost, 
session, trial number, type x 
game, type x cost 
 259 
RESULTS 260 
Non-social games (training) 261 
Figure 2 presents the proportion of trials in which chimpanzees playing alone selected the 262 
option that delivered food to the opposite side instead of the default 6/0 as a function of cost at the 263 
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subject’s side and door state. GLMM01 was significant compared to the null model (likelihood ratio 264 
test: χ²=105.58, df=6, p<0.001). We only found a significant interaction between door and cost 265 
(estimate ± SE: -1.00 ± 0.29, χ²=11.77, df=1, p<0.001; see Table S4). Post-hoc tests revealed that 266 
chimpanzees maximized their payoffs in cost condition when the door was open and they could gain 267 
access to 5+3 pieces of food than when it was closed and they would only get 5 pieces (1.35 ± 0.21, 268 
χ²=44.69, df=1, p<0.001). In the no cost condition, subjects’ choices were not significantly affected 269 
by the door state (0.35 ± 0.21, χ²=2.87, df=1, p=0.090). Moreover, subjects preferentially selected 6/0 270 
over 5/0 (80.1%, T+=21, N=6, p=0.031) when the door was closed and 0/3 over 0/0 (97.2 %, T+=21, 271 
N=6, p=0.031) when it was open (see SI for additional analyses). Taken together these results provide 272 
evidence that subjects paid attention to the quantities on their side and on their partner’s side. 273 
Furthermore, they adjusted their choices to the state of the door to maximize their outcome.  274 
Figure 2 around here 275 
 276 
Figure 2. Proportion of trials (mean ± SE) of the common conditions in the Door open/closed non-277 
social tests in which chimpanzees preferred the option that delivered food to the opposite side (over 278 
the default 6/0 option) as a function of cost and door state. * denotes significant deviations from the 279 
hypothetical chance level (dashed line), p<0.05, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. 280 
 281 
Social games 282 
Figure 3 presents the proportion of trials in which chimpanzees selected the options that 283 
delivered food to their partner’s side (compared to the default 6/0 option) as a function of game, cost 284 
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and gift. GLMM02 (see SI) was significant compared to the null model (χ²=82.01, df=8, p<0.001), 285 
however we found no significant interactions (all p>0.1). 286 
Figure 3 around here 287 
 288 
Figure 3.  Proportion of trials (mean ± SE) in which chimpanzees preferred the option that delivered 289 
food to their partner’s side over the default 6/0 option as a function of game (DG, UG), size of the gift 290 
for the partner (x/9 vs. x/3), and cost at the subject’s side (cost: 5/x; no cost: 6/x). * denotes 291 
significant deviations from the hypothetical chance level (dashed line), p<0.05, Wilcoxon signed-rank 292 
tests. 293 
A reduced model without the 2-way interactions was significant compared to the null model 294 
(χ²=76.93, df=5, p<0.001; see Table S5). Subjects were more willing to deliver food to the partner 295 
when there was no cost (-1.11 ± 0.16, χ²=52.96, df=1, p<0.001) and when the gift for the partner was 296 
large (-0.63 ± 0.16, χ²=16.91, df=1, p<0.001). Moreover, the likelihood to deliver food to the partner 297 
decreased over sessions (-0.18 ± 0.08, χ²=5.66, df=1, p=0.017). There was no significant difference 298 
between the games (-0.24 ± 0.15, χ²=2.37, df=1, p=0.124) or a significant main effect of trial number 299 
(-0.007 ± 0.08, χ²=0.008, df=1, p=0.930). Taken together these results show that chimpanzees played 300 
DG and UG in a similar way. They delivered food to their partners predominantly when this did not 301 
entail a cost for them but they were also more generous with larger amounts of food for the partner. 302 
Figure 4 presents the proportion of trials in which chimpanzees selected the option that 303 
delivered food to their partner’s side as a function of game and proposer’s cost. We compared the 304 
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social games and the non-social training (door-closed condition; data pooled across the training 305 
phases because our analyses had shown that performance remained unchanged throughout training 306 
phases, see SI). GLMM03 was significant compared to the null model (χ²= 98.56, df=3, p<0.001; see 307 
Table S6). Proposers were more willing to deliver food to the other side when there was no cost for 308 
them (-1.40 ± 0.15, χ²= 92.63, df=1, p<0.001). We found a significant effect of game (χ²= 6.72, df=2, 309 
p=0.035), specifically, subjects delivered more food to the other side in DG compared to the non-310 
social training (0.43 ± 0.19, z= 2.33, p=0.020) but not between the UG and training (-0.06 ± 0.19, z= -311 
0.34, p=0.736). Consequently, chimpanzees only chose the prosocial options significantly more often 312 
when there was no cost associated with it in the DG compared to when they played alone. 313 
Figure 4 around here 314 
 315 
Figure 4.  Proportion of trials (mean ± SE) in which proposers selected the option that delivered food 316 
to their partner’s side as a function of game (non-social control, DG, UG) and cost for the proposer. 317 
*denotes significant deviations from the hypothetical chance level (dashed line), p<0.05, Wilcoxon 318 
signed-rank tests. 319 
 320 
We also analyzed the two games separately. In both the UG and DG, proposers were 321 
significantly more willing to deliver food to the partner when they incurred no cost (UG: -0.91 ± 0.22, 322 
χ²=17.69, df=1, p<0.001; DG: -1.33 ± 0.28, χ²=8.27, df=1, p=0.004). In the UG, this happened also 323 
when the gift for the partner was large (0.88 ± 0.22, χ²=16.52, df=1, p<0.001). In contrast, no 324 
significant effect of gift was found in DG (0.39 ± 0.22, χ²=3.16, df=1, p=0.076). Moreover, in UG 325 
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proposers became less inclined to deliver food across sessions (-0.26 ± 0.11, χ²=5.82, df=1, p=0.016). 326 
Thus, in both games chimpanzee proposers paid attention to the cost. They seemed to pay attention to 327 
the gift for the partner particularly in UG, although they decreased the food delivery over sessions. 328 
Ultimatum game: acceptance rates 329 
Recipients accepted all offers above zero whereas zero offers were accepted in 58.3 ± 7.1% of 330 
trials. GLMM04 was not significant compared to the null-model (χ²=8.09, df=5, p=0.151), neither was 331 
a reduced without the interaction (χ²=6.89, df=4, p=0.142).  332 
Reciprocity 333 
Except for a male-male dyad in which one subject reciprocated prosocial offers (see Tables S9, S10 334 
and Figure S2), we found no evidence for short-term reciprocity: neither the offers in the previous 335 
trial (GLMM05) nor the average offers in the previous session (GLMM06) had a significant effect on 336 
performance. 337 
Communication 338 
All recipients except one sometimes pointed to a preferred option in the social games (13.4 ± 5.2 % of 339 
all trials, range: 0 – 42.7%). Recipients pointed usually before the proposers had chosen (98.0 ± 1.7 % 340 
of pointing trials). We found no evidence for a significant difference in pointing frequencies between 341 
the UG (mean ± SE: 22.0 ± 7.8%) and DG (8.6 ± 4.4%;  see Table S13 and GLMM07 in the SI). We 342 
found no evidence that pointing changed the likelihood of the proposers providing food for the 343 
recipients (GLMM08, see Table S14). Direct interactions between participants occurred only 34 times 344 
(5.9% of all trials). Twenty-nine of these interactions occurred in the UG and five in DG. Due to the 345 
small number of instances, we could not analyze whether there was a significant effect of these 346 
interactions on the proposer’s performance.  347 
DISCUSSION 348 
We tested chimpanzees using an iterated UG/DG protocol. Unlike humans, chimpanzee 349 
responders behaved as rational maximizers, invariably accepting offers larger than zero, something 350 
that is inconsistent with advantageous or disadvantageous inequity aversion, at least in the context of 351 
bargaining games and bearing in mind that our study does not cover all the aspects typically addressed 352 
in studies with adult humans. This is a very strong finding that has now been replicated in three other 353 
studies (Jensen et al., 2007; Kaiser et al., 2012; Proctor et al., 2013). Similarly to Jensen and 354 
colleagues’ study (2007), chimpanzees accepted more than half of the zero offers. It has been argued 355 
that such high acceptance rates might indicate poor understanding of the task (Brosnan, 2013). 356 
However, we have provided robust and stable evidence of subjects’ understanding of the 357 
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contingencies of the game, which required paying attention to 1) the quantities on their side, 2) the 358 
opposite side, and 3) the consequences of choosing between the two options available. Another 359 
explanation for the lack of rational maximization is that long delays to reject may increase “false” 360 
acceptances to make a new trial start (Smith & Silberberg, 2010). However, this explanation is 361 
unlikely since we reduced the rejection period to 15 seconds (lower than 60s in Jensen et al., 2007 and 362 
30s in Proctor et al., 2013) and kept the time between trials constant. Thus, as Henrich and Silk 363 
argued (2013), in a game where both accepting and rejecting a zero option invariably leads to a zero 364 
outcome, rejections may occur at chance (in accordance with our results) and still be compatible with 365 
rational maximization.  366 
Proposers provided more food to conspecifics in the DG than when they played alone. In fact, 367 
such prosocial offers resemble those made by humans in the same game and are also in line with the 368 
change of preferences to offer more in social rather than non-social conditions of Proctor and 369 
colleagues's study (2013). However, proposers offered the same in the UG regardless of the presence 370 
of the partner, which differs from Proctor et al.'s (2013), where proposers offered more than expected 371 
in an UG.  Such finding is puzzling from the point of view of classical economics. Brosnan & de 372 
Waal (2014) suggested that prosociality or anticipatory avoidance of conflict could explain this result.  373 
However, some methodological concerns made these explanations contentious. The absence of 374 
rejections might be due to the presence of a begging experimenter as well as to the fact that “neither 375 
species was explicitly trained that refusal was an option” (Proctor et al., 2013). 376 
We found some evidence of a calculated prosociality that regulates gifts provided the 377 
proposers prefer not incurring costs. Probably the proposer first and foremost focused on her own 378 
payoffs, and secondarily, on her partner’s. Interestingly, proposers did not offer more in the UG than 379 
the DG, as would have been expected for the sake of avoiding rejections. Perhaps the recipients’ 380 
behavior can explain this outcome. While human proposers face high risk of rejection, chimpanzee 381 
proposers do not, given the high acceptance rate of their conspecifics. Responders accepting half of 382 
the time do not force proposers to be generous, since any selfish offer is likely to be accepted at least 383 
half of the time. This would justify the significant decrement of prosocial offers in UG, but it would 384 
not explain doing so also at no cost. One explanation might be that proposers facing a rejection of a 385 
selfish option would not be willing to reward the partner with food in a future trial and persist in 386 
offering less and less food. This would be similar to continue punishing the recipient for rejecting 387 
instead of rewarding the recipient to make him more willing to accept. If that was the case, there 388 
would be no signs of second-order inequity aversion in chimpanzee proposers after the recipients’ 389 
refusals, contrary to previous interpretations (Brosnan & de Waal, 2014), but a lack of strategic 390 
behavior characteristic of human proposers’ performance. 391 
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Despite large methodological differences, the four studies conducted so far (Jensen et al., 392 
2007; Kaiser et al., 2012; Proctor et al., 2013 and the present one) have consistently shown that 393 
chimpanzees seem to differ when they play UG and DG, suggesting a divergent evolutionary pathway 394 
in the consideration of fairness. It is especially remarkable that no ape had rejected any offer different 395 
from zero so far. Kaiser and colleagues (Kaiser et al., 2012) argued that chimpanzee recipients in 396 
these games may not interpret a low offer as unfair. Although chimpanzees share food routinely, they 397 
did not usually offer food to each other (Gilby, 2006), so perhaps any offer is surprising and thus no 398 
unfairness is perceived. In contrast to humans, where the majority of cultures impose some kind of 399 
justice that is likely to be claimed and to cause rejections if not accomplished, non-human primates do 400 
not seem to possess an agreement on how to split windfall resources. Hence, rejections are probably 401 
only present in societies which define themselves as a community with some agreement on abstract 402 
entitlements among its members (which may explain why humans are more likely to reject a low offer 403 
from another human but not from a computer (Blount, 1995)). One could argue that we would have 404 
obtained different results if we had used much more valuable or much larger rewards. However, due 405 
to their natural occurrence, we would argue that smaller rather than very large windfalls are likely to 406 
be more common on a daily basis, and consequently, more relevant. 407 
The virtual absence of rejections in the UG has also to be squared off with the seemingly 408 
contradictory results from other studies with non-human primates. For instance, a task that required 409 
the same effort from pairs of individuals but rewarded them differentially fostered rejection in 410 
capuchin monkeys (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003 but see also Bräuer, Call, & Tomasello, 2009; 411 
Silberberg, Crescimbene, Addessi, Anderson, & Visalberghi, 2009). Why did capuchin monkeys 412 
reject food in that study and chimpanzees did not when playing the UG? Windfall resources are not 413 
common in nature but effortful activities (e.g. hunting, foraging) are. Thus, non-human primates may 414 
consider merit rather than equality as a measuring rod for fairness, making deservingness comparable 415 
to something factual rather than to something abstract. Therefore, in order to obtain a deeper 416 
understanding of non-human primates’ concept of fairness and force proposers to face the risk of a 417 
potential rejection, novel tasks with factual comparisons, such as different labour investments, are 418 
required.  419 
Communication and establishing turn taking is one way by which human children manage to 420 
split windfalls equally in coordination games (Grüneisen, 2015; Sánchez-Amaro, Duguid, Call, & 421 
Tomasello, 2016). We found no evidence that communication or reciprocity fostered a more equitable 422 
distribution of payoffs, in accordance to previous findings (Vonk et al., 2008). However, it is 423 
interesting to note that in our study only recipients (except for one single occasion) emitted pointing 424 
gestures to their proposer partners because pointing is usually reported between human experimenters 425 
and captive non-human primates (up to 71% of captive chimpanzees pointed to unreachable food in 426 
Leaven’s studies (Leavens, Hopkins, & Bard, 2005)) rather than between conspecifics (Itakura, 1996). 427 
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In our case, pointing did not significantly alter the proposers’ subsequent actions, but it seems clear 428 
that chimpanzee responders were trying to use some way of local enhancement that was inefficiently 429 
understood by proposers, as was previously reported in a similar proposer/recipient design (Silk et al., 430 
2005). It is unlikely that chimpanzee responders in our study were trying to reach the food, because 431 
they did not point when the proposer was absent. Therefore, it seems that even when chimpanzees 432 
individually use pointing as a referential gesture to humans, they find difficulties to transfer the same 433 
meaning within their species, as if response to pointing was very limited between species. It might 434 
happen that proposers do not perceive themselves as the addressee of such communication (however, 435 
see orangutans’ performance on referential pointing plus a discussion about the inferences required to 436 
comprehend pointing, Moore, Call, & Tomasello, 2015).  437 
CONCLUSIONS 438 
In conclusion, our results are compatible with the existence of intrinsic (although non-costly) 439 
prosociality and rational maximization behavior, but provide no evidence of inequity aversion. There 440 
were no signs of reciprocity and proposers did not change their behavior even if it led to rejection 441 
(contrary to the strategic behavior characteristic of human proposers’ performance). These findings 442 
suggest that prosociality, inequity aversion and strategic behavior might have followed different 443 
evolutionary pathways in the two species. 444 
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FIGURE LEGENDS 616 
Figure 1. Illustration of the apparatus for the DG (a) and UG (b) in the condition 6/0 (background) 6/3 617 
(foreground). The proposer is depicted on the left and the recipient on the right. In the DG, the 618 
recipient cannot reject the offer. In the UG, the recipient can respond to the offer by pulling the U-619 
shaped rope (accept) or not (reject) once the proposer has chosen one option. 620 
Table 1. Conditions and maximizing choices. Quantities used in non-social (Door Open/Door Closed) 621 
and social games. Depicted are the outcomes in each non-social condition based on a maximizing 622 
outcome. We also provide the labels of each pair of options used in social games to better illustrate 623 
the factors assessed (cost for the proposer; gift for the recipient) 624 
Table 2. Summary of the main GLMMs performed. See more information in SI. 625 
Figure 2. Proportion of trials (mean ± SE) of the common conditions in the Door open/closed non-626 
social tests in which chimpanzees preferred the option that delivered food to the opposite side (over 627 
the default 6/0 option) as a function of cost and door state. * denotes significant deviations from the 628 
hypothetical chance level (dashed line), p<0.05, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. 629 
Figure 3.  Proportion of trials (mean ± SE) in which chimpanzees preferred the option that delivered 630 
food to their partner’s side over the default 6/0 option as a function of game (DG, UG), size of the gift 631 
for the partner (x/9 vs. x/3), and cost at the subject’s side (cost: 5/x; no cost: 6/x). * denotes 632 
significant deviations from the hypothetical chance level (dashed line), p<0.05, Wilcoxon signed-rank 633 
tests. 634 
Figure 4.  Proportion of trials (mean ± SE) in which proposers selected the option that delivered food 635 
to their partner’s side as a function of game (non-social control, DG, UG) and cost for the proposer. 636 
*denotes significant deviations from the hypothetical chance level (dashed line), p<0.05, Wilcoxon 637 
signed-rank tests. 638 
